THE GEORGE TRYMAN REPORT

OPERATION MOCKING BIRD

CIA CONTROL OVER CORPOATE MEDIA

CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND NEWS

PROPAGANDA

SPECIAL PSYOPS TO MIND WAR    

INFORMATION WARFARE BY US GOVT

CONTROLLED MEDIA

PYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND MIND CONTROL

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POSTED  THURS FEB 12 2009   THE GEORGE TRYMAN SHOW

RE UPDATED  WED JULY 15 2009  CIA  INFORMATION PROPAGANDA WARFARE AND SPEICAL OPERATIONS MANUALS

Neuro-linguistic programming - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

MASS MEDIA MANIPULATION AND THE WORLD OF ILLUSION   

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 HISTORY OF CIA MIND CONTROL AND COVERT OPERATIONS   MJ 12  WILLIAN M COOPER

Information Warfare Timeline
<U>Information Warfare Timeline</U>

Disclaimer � This timeline is largely based o­n Greg Rattray�s excellent discussion of the development of information warfare doctrine in his book �Strategic Information Warfare in Cyberspace� (MIT Press : Cambridge, 2001). The information in this timeline has been updated and supplemented with hyper-links and additional information gleaned from other sources and the IWMP�s own case-studies.

Point and click the year you wish to visit:

1939-1945
1952
1960s
1968
1970s
1980s
1980s (late)
1987
1990s
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

1939-1945

� WWII spawns innovations in the fields of microwave transmission, electronic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), broadcasting, and jamming. During the war, the use of strategic level deception tactics, encryption technologies (ex. Enigma) and code-breakingBodyguard and Overlord in 1944).
� The work of Alan Turing during this period contributes greatly to the eventual development of computers. (more)

1952

� The Cold War sparks increased interest in the exploitation and protection of sensitive communications in the United States. This concern provides the basis for the establishment of the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA was designed to assume responsibility for the oversight of all classified US national security communications that were previously handled by the Communications Security Board (CSB).

1960s

� The Cold War continues to increase military reliance o­n the development of secure communications and advanced interception or jamming technologies. During this period computers become increasingly central to the operation of both civilian and military telecommunications networks. As large and increasingly global organizations � such as corporations and even the US military - begin to rely more and more o­n computers to manage their operations, the importance of devising more efficient methods of exchanging digital data gains greater salience.
� The first commercial telecommunications satellites are launched � i.e. those of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) and the International Marine Satellite Consortium (INMARSAT).

1968

� The Pentagon�s Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) establishes the first Internet � i.e. the ARPAnet - as a way of allowing computer scientists and engineers working o­n defense research to share information and computing resources. (more)

1970s

� The US military voices concern over possible interception of long-distance telephone traffic in the United States. Presidential Directive 24, concerning �Telecommunications Protection Policy�, tries to address some of these concerns.
� The Army�s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) begins exploring new war-fighting strategies after the defeat of US forces in Vietnam. The work of TRADOC begins laying the groundwork for the eventual Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that gains steam during the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.

1980s

� Computing power and performance increases exponentially as the possibility of digitizing nearly all types of information (i.e. digital convergence) is raised.

� o­n July 15th, 1982, the Reagan administration begins elaborating a new propaganda strategy for the US, by promulgating National Security Decision Directive Number 45 (NSDD 45). NSDD 45 called upon the US government funded International Communications Agency - which oversaw the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) and Radio Marti (among others) � to adopt a comprehensive modernization program designed to perfect radio and television frequency jamming and anti-jamming techniques and to carry out inquiries into the feasibility of implementing Direct Broadcasting by Satellite (DBS) technology by the late 1980s. NSDD 45 also gave �high-priority� to diplomatic efforts geared at securing the infrastructure necessary for such a global communications strategy from allied and enemy states and mandating a �priority� study of �the role of US broadcast facilities and operations in periods of crisis and war.� The eventual aim of this study was to �make recommendations for the closer integration of our [sic] international broadcasting effort into political and military contingency planning.�

� Another Presidential directive, NSDD 77 � also known as the �Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security� directive � was signed by Reagan o­n January 14th, 1983. NSDD 77 established a Special Planning Group (SPG) under the auspices of the USA�s National Security Council (NSC) in order to better manage Washington�s new global information strategy. The SPG brought under its roof all of the key personnel responsible for the crafting of US foreign policy (i.e. the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the US Information Agency, the Director of the Agency of International Development, and the Assistant to the President for Communications). This elite group was tasked with managing �the overall planning, direction, coordination, and monitoring of public diplomacy activities�[and to] ensure that a wide ranging program of effective initiatives is developed in order to support national security policy, objectives and decisions.� To this end the directive also established four interagency standing committees to coordinate various functions such as Public Affairs, International Information, International Political Activities, and International Broadcasting.

� Under Executive Order 12382, Washington established the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) as the focal point for interaction between the government and private sector regarding national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. These provisions were further elaborated in Executive Order 12472, which established the National Communications System (NCS).

� During the Reagan administration, the US government terminated AT&Ts regulated monopoly o­n most major telecommunications and information network services.

� Concerns about digital intrusion and attacks increased throughout the 1980s, mostly revolving around tools and techniques developed by relatively small, sophisticated groups of hackers. Digital intruders initially focus o­n developing means for gaining access to public switched telephone networks, as well as national security and academic computer networks, such as DARPAnet and NSFnet.

� Much of hacking literature in the 1980s focused o­n gaining access to protected computer systems through password exploitation. During this period software programs known as war-dialers were developed to identify network access points such as dial-up ports for test and maintenance activities. Other programs known as password crackers are also developed during the decade, further facilitating the ability of hackers to penetrate secure systems. Hacker literature during this period also explored a range of non-digital means to gain access to secure networks, including: dumpster diving, social engineering (i.e. deception/disguise) and strategies for physical entry into telephone switching facilities as means of exploiting secured systems. (Rattray, p.102-107 - more)

late-1980s

� A surge of virus outbreaks is recorded, including: the Morris worm, the IBM Christmas Card and the Pakistani Brain virus (among others).

1987

� The Computer Security Act (CSA) is signed into law, redefining the role of federal government agencies in providing information security. Under the Act, the National Security Agency (NSA) was charged with the establishment of guidelines and procedures for classified national security information and systems. The Commerce Department�s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), was given responsibility for developing policies and overseeing programs related to the protection of unclassified, but sensitive, federal government information. According to Gregory Rattray, the divesture of AT&T and the introduction of the Computer Security Act (CSA) �largely eliminated any direct government mechanisms for assuring security and reliability of an increasingly diverse US information infrastructure by the end of the 1980s.� (Rattray, p.314)

1990s

� The development of the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) by the Department of Defense (DOD) allows for the development of a network of networks emphasizing the ease of interconnection and spurring the development of the Internet.

� Viruses become increasingly common. A generally observed trend appears to point towards an inverse relationship between the increasing sophistication of viruses and the decreasing skill sets required to launch them. (more)

� According to Gregory Rattray, �The United States clearly established its leadership during the 1990s among global efforts to move into the information age. Commercial firms such as Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, and Sun Microsystems dominated much of the world�s computer and networking markets. US-based telecommunications companies including AT&T, Worldcom, and BellSouth aggressively competed for customers at home and abroad. US individuals and corporations were the most prolific users of the Internet and other advanced technology applications at the close of the decade. The federal government attempted to foster international leadership in this realm through policy initiatives, legislative action, and negotiations. Motivated principally by desires for economic advantage and opportunities for social gain, these activities also influenced the environment for national security efforts to deal with strategic information warfare� (Rattray, p.342)

1990

� Large-scale outages are reported o­n AT&T�s networks.

� From April 1990 to May 1991, hackers from the Netherlands penetrate 34 DOD sites, resulting in Congressional investigation and hearings in late 1991.

� The US Navy begins development of a project called Copernicus, which will focus o­n improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems for naval war-fighting forces. The Navy�s general approach throughout the decade with respect to information warfare (IW) will largely focus o­n improving battlefield operations. Throughout the 1990s, the Navy looked to command-and-control warfare (C2W) and IW as a means of providing sensor-to-shooter links and of integrating information networks in a joint environment for deployed Navy and Marine forces. (Rattray, p.324-325)

1991

� The first Persian Gulf War creates a watershed in US military thinking about information warfare. As a result of the conflict, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) begins to gain ground as a concept, as two levels of change confront the US military: (1) in the near term, the increasing desire to further integrate advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems with stealthy, long range, precision weapons systems that would establish dominance in future battlefield engagements, and (2) a longer term shift, in which RMA thinkers stressed the importance of developing a, until then, loosely articulated concept known as information warfare (IW) - in which the ability of IW to degrade or even paralyze an opponent�s command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems was emphasized. (Rattray, p.314-315)

� Large-scale outages in AT&T�s networks are o­nce again reported.

� Congressional investigation and hearings regarding network security are held.

� The National Research Council (NRC)�s report Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age provides an early notice of new challenges confronting the protection of US information infrastructures. The report was seen as a response to a series of virus attacks o­n computer networks in the US during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Computers at Risk looked beyond protective efforts of individuals and separate organizations to address the broader problems of securing the US national information infrastructure (NII). The report found that the overall security of information resources was determined by the weakest links in the chain of networked computers; making it clear that the US government�s national security/emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications systems were increasingly at risk. The report concludes that, �We [i.e. the United States] are at risk. Increasingly, America depends o­n computers. They control power delivery, communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital information, from medical records to business plans to criminal records. Although we trust them, they are vulnerable � to the effects of poor design and insufficient quality, to accident, and perhaps most alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow�s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.� (Rattray, p.330-331)

� Advocacy groups within the United States are formed that champion freedom of use and privacy in the world of cyberspace. They include the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), which become major voices in national debates over telecommunications deregulation and encryption controls.
� Duane Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I), floats the possibility of �knowledge warfare� in which �each side will try to shape enemy actions by manipulating the flow of intelligence and information.� (Rattray, p.316)

1992

� DoD Directive TS3600.1, entitled �Information Warfare� (December) becomes the earliest official framework document regarding the conduct of information warfare.

� The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) establishes a Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Program (VAAP) to identify weaknesses in defense information systems.

� The pamphlet C4I for the Warrior is published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June. The document focuses o­n enhancing traditional battlefield operations through C4I systems.

� The so-called Clipper Chip controversy begins to take shape (PGP encryption is also o­n the board, spurring privacy advocates to take action against government attempts to curtail the strength of commercially available encryption software).

1993

� The Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 30, entitled Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is released in March. It defines C2W as �the strategy that implements information warfare o­n the battlefield and integrates physical destruction. Its objective is to decapitate the enemy�s command structure from its body of combat forces.� The means listed to achieve these goals included �operations security, psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare and destruction (hard kill and weapons effects).� As part of the MOP 30 memorandum, individual services were tasked with developing their own C2 programs. (Rattray, p.315)

� The Air Intelligence Agency (AIA)�s Joint Electronic Warfare Center at Kelly Air Force Base (Texas) is renamed the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) after the release of MOP-30. The Air Force begins grappling with its own information warfare (IW) doctrine in April. In September it renamed its Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (AFEWC) the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC). (Rattray, p.315)

� A National Communications System (NCS) report states that �the threat that contemporary computer intruders pose to the public switched network (PSN) is significant and rapidly changing.� The conclusion is important since national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) relies heavily o­n the PSN. The NCS report noted the growing skill of intruders. This report established a trend throughout the 1990s in which NCS and National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) studies repeatedly stressed the linkages between the defense information infrastructure (DII) and the US�s general NS/EP with the integrity of commercial telecommunications networks and other portions of the national information infrastructure (NII). (Rattray, p.331)

1994

� o­n January 1, 1994, the rebellion of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) in Mexico�s Chiapas province is unleashed in response to the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the neglect of indigenous communities in the country. The Zapatista rebellion employs Internet technologies to mobilize a global solidarity movement, marking o­ne of the earliest instances of a successful infowar/netwar that neutralized the Mexican military and that makes the most of the newly available modes of communication. (more)

� The report of the Joint Security Commission (JSC) - established to deal with changing concerns about the protection of information relating to national security in the post-Cold War environment - entitled Redefining Security, found serious flaws in the increasingly dated approaches to computer security prevalent among US services. The recommendations of the JSC lead to the promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive 29 (PDD-29) o­n �Security Policy Coordination� in September, which established the Security Policy Board (SPB) to handle these concerns. The SPB was to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and would include the Deputy Secretaries from Defense, State, Justice, Energy and Commerce, as well as the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The SPB soon became �a principal mechanism for educating a broader range of federal government actors about this emerging national security concern� (Rattray, p.332).

� Timothy Sample of the Hudson Institute, commenting o­n the economic potential of information warfare (IW) strategies stated that, �The goal of this avenue of coercion would be to engage the voice of the targeted country�s business to confront its government. For example, the ability to access a company�s computer network and manipulate design, production and marketing data, or go into accounting records and �zero-out� entries would have a devastating effect o­n operations.� (Rattray, p.316)

� In the spring, the Army Chief of Staff declares that, �the Army�s institutional response to the demands of the information age is Force XXI, a structured effort to redesign the Army � [including its] units, processes and organizations � from those of the industrial age to those of the information age.� Within the Force XXI vision, the Army stresses the need to leverage information technologies in support of operations o­n a digitized battlefield. It emphasizes the need to win the battlefield information war through �increasingly integrated systems to collect, disseminate and rapidly act o­n information.� (Rattray, p.323) The US Army eventually begins instituting the �Army After Next� program as a follow-on to Force XXI with the same general focus o­n attaining superiority o­n the digitized battlefield of the future.

� The Navy published its SONATA report, which outlined an information warfare strategy for space and electronic warfare as part of its broader Copernicus vision. The report acknowledged that over-reliance o­n global, commercially operated information infrastructures could constitute a tactical center of gravity for potential US adversaries. In April, the Navy issued an operating instruction outlining IW/C2W responsibilities based very heavily o­n the MOP 30 approach (i.e. by considering C2W as the military application of IW). (Rattray, p.324)

� Between April and May, 150 Internet intrusions are recorded against the Air Force command and control facility at Rome Laboratory at Griffiss Air Force Base, New York. As a result of these intrusions, the hackers were able to seize control of Rome�s computer support systems for several days and to compromise an air tasking order research project at the labs. The hackers were also able to access systems at other government facilities, including NASA�s Goddard Flight Space Center and Jet Propulsion Lab, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and Army missile R&D facilities as well as the Korean Nuclear Research Agency in Seoul. The FBI and British officials eventually traced the intruders back to the UK. (Rattray, p.317, 421)

� The Defense Science Board (DSB)�s Summer Study Task Force produced a report entitled Information Architecture for the Battlefield, which provided a major impetus to official efforts and concerns surrounding a strategic level of information warfare. According to the authors of the report, �Information Warfare then is a national strategic concern. Our [sic] economy, national life and military capabilities are very dependent o­n information � information often vulnerable to exploitation or disruption.� The report helped to drive the further development of policies and approaches based o­n protecting non-classified resources and managing the risk posed by heavy reliance o­n commercial information infrastructures. (Rattray, p.318)

� In August, the Air Force held a summit of its four-star Generals to discuss the issue of information warfare (IW). They agreed that offensive IW would provide a multiplier for future forces but that serious defensive concerns had already emerged. Their conclusions focused o­n the enhanced ability of US forces to exploit decision making advantages as a result of the new technologies. (Rattray, p.321)

� An Information Warfare Directorate was established within the ASD/C3I. The Information Security Office within ASD/C3I is renamed the Information Assurance Office in order �to promote awareness, build consensus and provide direction for defense of our DOD systems from exploitation.� (Rattray, p.333-334)

� The Joint C2 Warfare Center (JC2WC) opens in October. Gen. John Sheehan, Commander and Chief of the Atlantic Command comments o­n the possibility of deterring large-scale conflict through the waging of information warfare (IW). Gen. (retired) James McCarthy floats idea that the US may �deny electronic access to foreign accounts or alter internal financial records of the [adversary�s] elite to cause confusion or frustration.� (Rattray, p.316)

� The Air Force Information Warfare Center / Computer Emergency Response Team (AFIWC/CERT, a.k.a. AFCERT) began an o­n-line survey program focused o­n Air Force systems that yielded further information o­n critical vulnerabilities. (p.317)

1995

� According to Gregory Rattray, �The need to clarify the foreign IW threat to the nation led the newly formed DOD Information Warfare Executive Board to request a national intelligence estimate from the intelligence community in early 1995.� The DOD�s Information Warfare Executive Board and the ASD/C3I staff sponsored a continuing study by the RAND Corporation that specifically looked at strategic information warfare (SIW). Early in the year a series of exercises known as �The Day After in Cyberspace�� � and carried out by the RAND Corporation - endeavored to illuminate the defensive challenges faced by national security apparatus. SIW was defined as an emerging realm of conflict �wherein nations utilize cyberspace to affect strategic military operations and inflict damage o­n national information infrastructures.� (Rattray, p.333)

� The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)�s concern with cyber-threats (i.e. cyber-crime and its international dimensions) grew throughout the 1990s - especially in the wake of the Rome Labs incident � leading to the establishment of the FBI�s Computer Investigations Threat Assessment Center (CITAC). Deputy Attorney General Gorelick from the Department of Justice launched a major campaign to stress cyber-threat awareness through the Justice Department at about the same time. (Rattray, p.335-6, 375).

� The popular press begins picking up o­n the growing concern in government circles about national level digital attacks. In July 1995, an article published by Neil Munro in the Washington Post, entitled �The Pentagon�s New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor� becomes particularly influential in shaping public concerns over information vulnerabilities in the USA. The article was soon followed by a Time magazine article which quoted NSA Vice Admiral John McConnel as stating that, �We�re more vulnerable than any nation o­n earth.� This sets the stage for a period of ferment about the degree of national vulnerability and preparedness with respect to digital attacks o­n the US national information infrastructure (NII). (Rattray, p.337)

� In May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released Joint Publication 6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, which highlighted the importance of assuring a global information infrastructure (GII) in providing adequate support for US military operations overseas. The report also addressed DOD-operated systems. Joint Pub. 6-0 spurred the creation of new organizations within the Joint Staff, in order to deal with the broader range of security concerns confronting the US defense establishment. The newly formed organizations included: the Information Warfare-Special Technical Operations Branch (J-39) formed within the auspices of the Operations (J-3) Directorate, as well as the Information Assurance Branch (J6K), which was established under the auspices of the C4 Systems Directorate (J-6).

� Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) is issued in response to the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings in June, spurring a review of the vulnerability of government facilities in the US and critical national infrastructures to terrorist attack. In response to PDD-39, an interagency Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG) was formed in the fall. According to Rattray, this group �subsequently molded US efforts to deal with SIW defense. The group�s efforts to establish the baseline categories of critical infrastructures an two main threat categories were used in Executive Order 13010 in July 1996 to establish the PCCIP.� CIGW identified numerous threats to national security including, �malicious hackers, disgruntled insiders, organized criminals, foreign terrorist and nation-states.� (Rattray, p.335).

� In August, the Air Force publishes its first attempt at formalizing a doctrinal foundation for information warfare. The result was a white paper entitled Cornerstones of Information Warfare. According to the publication, information warfare theory �views information itself as a separate realm, potent weapon and lucrative target.� Information attacks involve �directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides�Direct information warfare affects information through altering its components without relying o­n adversary�s perceptions or interpretations.� The document acknowledges defensive concerns as �the other edge of the sword� and recommends that IW be incorporated into Air Force doctrine without trying to define a separate mission area (i.e. approaching IW as another means for accomplishing the Air Force�s core missions of aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support). (Rattray, p.321-322).

� Also in August, the Army published an Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet o­n information operation (IO), where IO was identified as, �the integrated approach to gaining and maintaining the information the warfighter requires to fight and win, while denying that same information to the enemy.�

� In September, the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence�s report o­n the Intelligence Authorization Bill for FY 1996 (S.922) called o­n the DCI and Secretary of Defense to issue a comprehensive report o­n threats to government and private computer and communications systems and to develop a plan with legislative and programmatic recommendations.
� In December, the Security Policy Board (SPB) issued a white paper o­n �security related challenges presented by the emergence of the NII� (Rattray, p.336).

1996

� The Joint Staff begins playing a guiding role in the formation of IW doctrine. In February it releases Joint Publication 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, which clarifies the relationship between C2W and information warfare (IW), stressing that �the full dimensions of IW policy and its implementation are still emerging.� C2W, as it was in MOP 30, is seen as �an application of IW in military operations and is a subset of IW.�

� In March, the Justice department illustrated its commitment to dealing decisively with the threat posed by hackers by announcing the arrest of an Argentinean hacker who had spent months using Harvard�s computer systems to gain access to DOD and NASA networks. (more)

� In May, the General Accounting Office (GAO) releases a report o­n the vulnerability of DOD computer systems.

� Also in May, the Joint Staff issues Instruction 6505.1A, �Defensive IW Implementation� that expands the scope of defensive IW from communications security to infrastructure protection.
� The RAND report based o­n the �Day After� exercises carried out in early-1995 is released under the title Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (full text). The report identified key points for future focus, reform, and attention in US military circles. It recommended the establishment of a �minimum essential information infrastructure� or MEII, to provide a backup for key communications functions in the case of an attack o­n the DII, NII, or GII.

� In the summer, the Joint Staff�s role in doctrinal formation is enhanced with the publication of Information Warfare. A Strategy for Peace. The Decisive Edge for War. (order) The document emphasizes a teamed approach to developing IW capacities (both offensive and defensive), including work with commercial service providers not o­nly for national security purposes but to �protect their proprietary interests as well.� The document describes the possibility of offensive IW, which �applies traditional perception management disciplines such as psychological operations and information system attack to produce a synergistic effect against the remaining elements of an adversary�s information systems, information transfer links and information nodes.� It describes a potential strategic role for IW in deterring crises and avoiding escalation, and even outlines the possibility of using IW against non-state actors (ex. For attacks o­n a drug-cartel�s communications networks). (Rattray, p.325-329)

� The Joint Staff releases Joint Vision 2010 � America�s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow in the summer of 1996 (full text), which discusses the use of both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW) for achieving �information superiority� o­n the battlefields of the future. Joint Vision 2010 also called for the development of strategic level applications of IW. This document has become a touchstone document regarding the Pentagon�s vision of future wars.

� o­n July 15, President Clinton�s Executive Order 13010 established the President�s Commission o­n Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) as well as the Infrastructure Protection Task Force (IPTF).

� The Air Force continued to refine its doctrine through a new white paper entitled Information Warfare. The document outlined information attack as a distinctly new means of applying force focusing largely o­n support for conventional operations.

� The Army�s information operations (IO) concept is formalized in document FM 100-6, entitled Information Operations, which defined IO as �continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance and protect the friendly force�s ability to collect, process and act o­n information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations. IO include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary�s information and decision capabilities.� The term IO is adopted in order �to recognize that information issues permeate the full range of military operations�from peace to global war.� FM 100-6 explicitly highlighted the news media (on a global scale) as the principal non-DOD organization of concern within this environment. The document evidenced great concern about an adversary�s capability to manipulate the global news media to ends not in accordance with US interests. In addition to these concerns, FM 100-6 also examined the importance of achieving battlefield advantage and information dominance in conflict situations. (Rattray, p.323-324)

� Published in November, the DSB Task Force�s o­n �Information Warfare-Defense� discussed the need for �the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability.� The DSB Task Force found that US cyber-security vulnerabilities were largely self-created, �we have created a target-rich environment and US industry has sold globally much of the generic technology that can be used to strike these targets� according to the report. (Rattray, p.318-319)

� Late in the year the DOD and the Joint Staff moved to adopt the term information operation (IO) instead of information warfare (IW). The main rationale for the change was that the term �warfare� was more generally perceived as a specific term dealing with actions in a crisis or conflict, whereas the term �operations� could deal with peacetime military missions as well (which fall under the general category of operations-other-than-war, or OOTW). The IO concept, previously o­nly used by the Army, was therefore officially adopted by the DOD in December by way of a directive o­n �Information Operations (IO)� (S3600.1). This new document replaced the older TS3600.1 �Information Warfare� directive from 1992. Accordingly IO was seen as a means to �secure peacetime national security objectives, deter conflict, protect DOD information and information systems and shape the information environment.� (Rattray, p.328-329)

1997

� The Air Force takes an increasing interest in information warfare (IW) concepts through its revised Air Force Basic Doctrine published in September. The document stresses air and space power but also notes that �information is now considered another medium in which some aspects of warfare can be conducted.� The document described IW missions as �involving such diverse activities�as psychological warfare, military deception, electronic combat and both physical and cyber-attack.�

� The PCCIP�s report, Critical Foundations is released o­n October 13th. It focused largely o­n the cyber-threat facing the USA�s national infrastructure. The report found that �our [sic] infrastructures are exposed to new vulnerabilities � cyber vulnerabilities � and new threats � cyber threats.� The PCCIP�s report lead to the formation of a National Security Council (NSC) interagency group tasked with making recommendations to the President. Although the PCCIP group was disbanded in late 1997, many of its personnel were included the NSC transition group. (Rattray, p.340)

� According to Hirsch Goodman, �Upon assuming office, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair and his influential media advisor Alistair Campbell commissioned a report o­n improved management of government communications. The Mountfield Report, submitted in [November] 1997 and accepted by the Prime Minister, suggested that government ought �to retain a politically impartial service and to sustain the trusted values of the service embodied in the rules of guidance� as well as �improve co-ordination with and from the Centre [i.e. the government], so as to get across consistently the Government's key policy themes and messages.� This was to be achieved through the establishment of a new strategic communications unit serving the entire government, improvements to the Cabinet Office's existing information technology system, and clearer rules o­n attribution. The report also called for the establishment of a round-the-clock monitoring unit, a quick response mechanism, and a framework that would �offer high-quality management and leadership, staffing and training and development tailored to meet the needs of the 24-hour media world.� The report's recommendations led to the �Government Information and Communication Service Handbook,� a manual for the civil service o­n how to manage its work with the media.�

� The congressionally sponsored National Defense Panel (NDP) report Transforming Defense was released in December. It discussed the ability of the US to meet asymmetric threats to the North American homeland through force restructuring, rather than another Gulf War scenario. Among other things, the document called for a Homeland Defense Command for North America. (Rattray, p.339)

1998

� In February teenaged hackers who intrude o­n key network elements in the United States belonging to MIT and the Pentagon in an incident that is dubbed Solar Sunrise. The breach renewed cyber-security concerns, despite the efforts made to address critical vulnerabilities. The incident provided a major impetus for the formation of a Joint Task Force o­n Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) later in the year. (more)

� In May, the recommendations of the National Security Council interagency group formed by the PCCIP resulted in the promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) regarding �Critical Infrastructure Protection.� PDD-63 closely followed the recommendations of the PCCIP, identifying as essential infrastructures those of: telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services in both the government and the private sectors. According to PDD-63, by 2004 the US was supposed to have the ability to protect critical infrastructures from intentional acts, recognize changes wrought within the cyberspace environment and identify the broad range of actors involved in any new type of protective effort. (Rattray, p.372-375, 379-380)

� Another orchestrated hacking effort known as Moonlight Maze begins infecting Pentagon systems in mid-1998. The effort lasts several years, further increasing concerns about lax cyber-security. The cyber-attacks, coordinated from computers based in the Russian Federation were aimed at accessing DOD scientific and technical data. ASD/C3I�s Art Money charged that, �Moonlight Maze brings a whole different, much more sophisticated approach. But it also brings another dimension � we are no longer dealing with hackers, but with the problem of state sponsored attack.� (Rattray, p.320) (more

� Hackers also managed to break into military servers used during US exercises in the Persian Gulf, thereby disrupting these activities and forcing them to come to a halt. Although the attacks were initially blamed o­n Iraq, they were eventually traced to two California teen-agers who had gained access to military systems. (more)

� Pakistani hacker group Milworm broke into India�s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) servers for the first time in June. Since then the BARC servers have become a favorite target of Pakistani hackers. (From Times of India)

� In August, the Air Force codified its vision of information warfare (IW) missions with the publication of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, entitled Information Operations.

� The most detailed articulation of the Navy�s own information warfare doctrine was provided in its Information Warfare Strategic Plan. The document conceived of information warfare (IW) as a means of enhancing �the ability of naval forces to successfully execute joint military operations.� Policy and legal constraints were found to prohibit the DOD from taking an �overtly proactive role� in the defense of the national information infrastructure (NII). (Rattray, p.325)

� The Joint Staff followed its December 1996 DOD directive with Joint Publication 3-13 in October, entitled Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (full text). Information operations (IO) and information warfare (IW) are distinguished in the following terms: �IO involves actions taken to affect adversary�s information and information systems while defending o­ne�s own information and information systems. IO applies across all phases of an operation and the range of military operations, and at every level of warfare. IW is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.� According to Rattray, the document reflected the general trend towards a more �expansive treatment of activities considered under the information warfare/information operations label.� (Rattray, p.330)

1999

� In January, hackers were accused of bringing down servers in Ireland that hosted the .tp top-level domain name, which was used as a cyber-space home for East Timorese independence activists belonging to the East Timorese Project (initiated by Nobel Prize winners Ramos Horta and Bishop Belo). The hackers replaced websites o­n the server with the slogan �E-Nazis Creating Chaos o­n the Net� and disrupted the email accounts belonging to the service�s 3,000 subscribers. After months of probing the .tp domain names defenses, a series of coordinated attacks were staged by a distributed computer network spanning locations as dispersed as Australia, Holland, Japan, and the United States. Connect-Ireland�s director, Martin Maguire, which hosts the service, claimed that the attack was most probably the responsibility of the Indonesian government, although several other theories were available o­n known hacker blogs. (From BBC)

� The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)�s intervention against Yugoslavia (March 24 � July 10) � known as Operation Allied Force - marked the first sustained use of the full-spectrum of information operations (IO) components in combat. The increasing use of the Internet during the conflict also gave it the distinction of being the �first war fought in cyberspace� or the �first war o­n the Internet.� The war included a highly orchestrated media campaign publicly waged by NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea, with daily press-briefings in Brussels and a parallel propaganda campaign waged by the Yugoslav government in Belgrade. In April, as part of their information warfare (IW) strategy, NATO forces began targeting the civilian communications infrastructure of Yugoslavia, including bombing raids carried out o­n Radio Television Serbia (RTS) transmitters and an attack o­n its head-office in Belgrade (which killed 16 journalists and RTS employees in the process).

� As part of its psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaign NATO planes dropped some 104,000 propaganda leaflets o­n Yugoslavia and flew 88 missions to broadcast pro-Allied Force messages.

� In May, during the height of the bombing campaign, the Pentagon�s General Counsel Office (GCO) issued a 50-page booklet with guidelines for waging cyberwar, entitled Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (full text), which the DoD had been developing since it first acknowledged using �offensive hacking� during its operations in Haiti in 1995. Experts suggested that the Pentagon refrain from launching a full fledged cyber-war o­n Yugoslavia�s limited information infrastructures for fear of concerted retaliation that would have probably done more damage to the expansive information infrastructure�s of NATO countries. (From The Guardian)

� During the bombing campaign, a pro-NATO hacker group calling itself Dutchthreat � which was lead by hackers using the names Xoloth1 and Meestervervalser - broke into and defaced a Yugoslav webserver that had set up an anti-NATO page under the domain name of pentagon.co.yu. In another case, US-based hackers from a group calling itself TeamSpl0it hit a number of websites during the war with anti-war messages condemning both sides and calling for an end to the NATO bombing campaign. (From CNN).

� In May, after NATO�s attack o­n the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese hackers went o­n a cyber-offensive in retaliation for the killing of three journalists in the embassy. The US departments of Energy, the Interior and the National Parks service were all hit. Furthermore, www.whitehouse.gov was shut down for three days due to security concerns stemming from a non-stop denial-of-service attack o­n its servers. The attacks o­n the White House website were claimed by the Hong Kong Danger Duo. Sandy Spark, from the DOE's Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), warned that a Chinese wave of e-mail with unresolvable IP addresses was being sent to U.S. government servers in an attempt to overload them. This prompted some government administrators to simply block all traffic coming from dot-cn IP addresses. (From CNN)

� In late May, Newsweek reported that President Clinton had issued an intelligence �finding� which authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to employ hacking tools and train Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) units in acts of physical sabotage against Yugoslavia�s communications infrastructure, gasoline reserves and food supplies. (From Wired)

� According to The Guardian�s summary concerning the NATO-Yugoslav cyberwar, �The Kosovan conflict has been called the first war o­n the internet. Hackers disrupted and defaced Serb and Nato websites, and jammed computer messaging systems with �email bombs.� Some were government-sponsored and some private, but they had a limited effect o­n each side's military capabilities. Meanwhile, a hidden internet battle for far higher stakes was under way. According to defence analysts, US computer hackers burrowed into Serb government email systems to read Belgrade's mind day by day, while some infiltrated their way into the internet systems of banks around the world in search of accounts held by Mr Milosevic and other Serbian leaders. There are divided views o­n whether they succeeded, but analysts agree that it was an early example of the wars yet to come, in which the struggle will turn o­n access to the enemy's financial and communications computer systems.� (full story)

� After the NATO-Yugoslav conflict a series of reports confirmed that Yugoslav forces had been successful in preserving most of the countries military hardware through the use of decoys and deception tactics that disrupted the targeting systems of NATO�s war-planes. (more)

� In August a series of bomb attacks across Russia triggered the Second Chechen War. Taking a cue from NATO press-briefings the Russian military imposed tight control over media images coming from the war-zone, improving upon the information-warfare component of the First Chechen War (1994-1996). (more)

� In the same month, a Chinese-Taiwanese hacker-war broke out with defacements of government sites in both countries after Taiwanese President Teng-hui Li floated the two-state theory with respect to relations between Beijing and Taipei. Chinese hackers began the war with attacks o­n Taiwanese sites, followed by a Taiwanese backlash. (From ZD Net)

� Also during the summer, Pakistani hackers cracked the Indian Army�s website o­n Kashmir and replaced it with allegations concerning torture of Kashmiri�s by Indian security forces. The defacement was dedicated to �all the Kashmiri brothers who are suffering the brutal repression of the Indian Army.� (From BBC

� In September a report released by the Air Force�s Office of Information, entitled The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made it Work largely confirmed that IO played a significant part in the campaign (full text). According to the report, �The secret new arts of disrupting enemy capabilities through cyber-space attacks appeared to have been a big part of the campaign.� However, confirmation of what actually was used or wasn�t will have to wait until the �tight veil of secrecy� surrounding such operations is finally lifted. (more)

� A week after the Air Force report appeared, another report, entitled A View from the Top - prepared by Adm. James Ellis who served o­n Joint Task Force�Noble Anvil (JTF-NA) during NATO�s 78-day air-war against Yugoslavia - described the actions of the information operations group, which was set up as an IO cell within his JTF unit as having �great success.� Retired Air Force Lieutenant Thomas McInerney suggested that the cell was engaged in highly sophisticated operations including interference with Yugoslavia�s advanced air-defense systems. The Naval report, however, found that although the available IO resources were there, they were mostly under utilized during the campaign. (more)

� In October, a day after the overthrow of the government of President Nawaz Sharif by Gen. Pervez Musharaf and his SSG Commandoes, the website of the Government of Punjab in Pakistan was hacked by individuals who used the exploit to proclaim their support for the military. All other government sites were also taken off the Internet. The feat was claimed by the Islamic Group of Hackers (Al-Sooraj wing). (From BBC)

� In November, during testimony in front of the US senate armed forces committee, Supreme Allied commander of NATO forces during the NATO war o­n Yugoslavia, Gen. Wesley Clark, claimed that the alliance could have more effectively waged war if it had actively engaged in �offensive hacking� and other elements of cyberwar against the government in Belgrade and its forces in the field. (From The Guardian)

� In a Council o­n Foreign Relations (CFR) report drafted in November, the suggestion was made that the use of non-lethal computer technologies to wage modern war could provide a �middle option� between diplomatic posturing and all out war for future crises. The CFR report argued that during the NATO war o­n Yugoslavia, microwave technology may have incapacitated Belgrade's electronic equipment, while cruise missiles equipped with carbon-fiber payloads could have shorted Yugoslavia�s electrical grid. Furthermore, other non-lethal means that could have been used included emitting transmissions from neighboring countries or sending in electronic warfare planes like the EA-6B Prowler, which could have subverted Belgrade's television broadcasts by slotting in reports of alleged Serb atrocities in Kosovo or replacing them wholesale with the BBC or CNN. (From The Guardian)

� In late November, hacktivists staged a concerted attack o­n the World Trade Organization (WTO)�s website in a coordinated assault in solidarity with a mass-based physical convergence of activists against the WTO meetings taking place in Seattle, Washington. (more)

� According to Rattray, by the end of the year �US military doctrine encompassed the potential significance of strategic level of information warfare in both offensive and defensive dimensions. However, the doctrine remained burdened by an expansive conceptualization of what constitutes information warfare and operations. This breadth was necessary to enable the DOD and services to grapple with the many concerns raised by the information age for military operations� (Rattray, p.330).

2000

� Iraq introduced Internet access into the country. Censorships seems to have been limited, with the CIA site as well as those of other free-email services blocked (probably done to ensure the monopoly over email services by the government controlled Uruklink ISP). International news-media websites, however, and those of Western governments were freely available. (From San Francisco Chronicle)

� In January, an Armenian-Azeri cyberwar heated up when Azeri hacker groups like Green Revenge and Hijak [sic] Team 187 hit a number of Armenian websites, including those of: Armenian State Television; the Armenian National Institute (ANI) in Washington, D.C., which is dedicated to the Armenian genocide; and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) - among other Armenian sites located mainly in Armenia, the USA and Canada that were affected. The attacks were apparently in retaliation for postings by a website called www.aliyev.com � mounted by California-based Ararat Technologies in late-1999 - which featured alleged fabrications about Azeri President Haidar Aliev. The attacks elicited a sharp response from the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, calling the attacks a violation of human rights, while the Washington, D.C.-based ANI called in the FBI�s Computer Crime Squad to investigate. (more)

� In February, Armenian hackers Liazor staged a series of retaliatory attacks o­n servers based in Azerbaijan, threatening to bring down the entire Azerbaijan section of the web according to the Azeri daily Zerkalo (including ISPs that serviced the NGO community in the country). (more)

� By mid-February, a new technical council to deal with cyber-security issues in Azerbaijan was established in response to the threat. The new council was to include National Security Ministry experts and o­n-line providers according to a decision reached between Azerbaijan�s Security Minister Namig Abbasov, newspaper editors-in-chief and computer company specialists. By mid-February officials in both countries were also calling for a halt to the attacks (which threatened to severely disrupt most of the Internet service in both countries). (more)

� In March, CNN reported that �hacktivists� from the Muslim o­nline Syndicate (MOS) coordinated over 600 attacks o­n Indian websites in response to the Indo-Pakistani low-intensity conflict near Kargil in Indian-administered Kash
techniques provides a decisive battlefield advantage to forces that mastered these elements of warfare (as illustrated in Allied Operation�s